All natural languages seem to distinguish at the semantic level between count nouns (CNs) and mass nouns (MNs). Some natural languages, like English, mark the distinction at the syntactic level. Prototypical ofCns is "dog" and of MNs is "matter" (in the sense of physical stulf). One syntactic difference is that CNs take the plural ('dogs') whereas MNs do not. Other syntactic dis¬ tinctions relate to the determiners and quantifiers. One can say a dog, another dog, many dogs, two dogs, etc.; one cannot correctly say *a matter, *another matter, *many matter, *two matter, etc. It seems that the distinction in English grammar was introduced by Jespersen (1924, p. 198).
Prototypical CNs and MNs
All natural languages seem to distinguish at the semantic level between count nouns (CNs) and mass nouns (MNs) . Some natural languages, like English, mark the distinction at the syntactic level. Prototypical ofCns is "dog" and of MNs is "matter" (in the sense of physical stulf). One syntactic difference is that CNs take the plural ('dogs') whereas MNs do not. Other syntactic dis¬ tinctions relate to the determiners and quantifiers. One can say a dog, another dog, many dogs, two dogs, etc.; one cannot correctly say *a matter, *another matter, *many matter, *two matter, etc. It seems that the distinction in English grammar was introduced by Jespersen (1924, p. 198) .
Languages differ in morphology, agreement rules and phrase structure, so one does not expect to find in every natural languages a count/mass distinction with the same linguistic correlates as in English. While many European languages are like English in this connection, not all are. Irish and Latin, for example, lack the ¡definite article, and so one cannot distintiguish CNs from MNs in those languages by the possibility or impossibility of adding the inde¬ finite article to the noun. If we inquire what guides linguists to the decision that there are a count/ mass distinction in languages, the answer cannot simply be grammar. Grammar varies greatly from language to language. Something other than grammar must be contributing to the decision. We submit that the type of reference for prototypical words plays a major role. We think that across variations in grammar there is a semantic uniformity in the interpretation of at least such prototypical nouns as the counterparts of dog and matter and that this semantic uni¬ formity is a good guide to the relevant grammatical facts in each language. We propose to exploit the semantic uniformity as far as possible.
This [1991] ). Pelletier and Schubert [1989] To discuss reports from these subcommittees, a committee of the whole C' is created. This new committee differs from C because the minutes will record all the transactions of C but omit those of C'. This shows that conceptually, C' is different from C. We regard C and C' as "for¬ mal' sups of A and B, a notion to be clarified in a forthcoming paper Besides these examples there are others such as quantity of matter which are important when dealing with functors among the categories of the nominal theory.
We interpret the nominal theory as follows: CNs are interpreted as situated sets (or kinds), namely, families of subsets of a given set indexed by situations. A subset indexed by a situation consists of all the members of the given set which are constituent of that situation. Situations are assumed to be pre-ordered by the relation of'having more information' (not to be confused with temporal order), and hence there are obvious connections between the subsets of the family. Morphisms between CNs are interpreted as situated maps, i.e., set-theoretical maps pre¬ serving the relation of constituents of a situation into members of another set which are cons¬ tituents of the same situation. Such maps we call underlying. MNs are interpreted as situated sup-lattices and morphisms as sup preserving situated maps. Finally, QNs are interpreted as situated sup-sketches, i.e., situated sets with a partial order relation and a set of distinguished formal "sups'. Morphisms between QNs are interpreted as situated maps which preserve the distinguished 'sups'. Functors of the nominal theory are interpreted as functors of the corres¬ ponding interpretations. For instance, formation of the plural is interpreted as (an enriched) power set functor between CN and A/A'. A word about situations in our approach. We do not attempt to develop a theory of situations along the lines of Barwise and Perry [1983] . Instead we take situations as unanalyzed primitives requiring only of them that they be sufficient to ground the truth or falsehood of certain sentences, a completely intuitive notion. Such situa¬ tions differ from possible worlds in that they need not ground the truth or falsehood of all sen¬ tences; only the sentences that may interest us.
For a more thorough philosophical discussion of the notion of situated set or kind the reader is referred to La Palme Reyes et al [1994 a] . We will only remark that it is a consequence of our approach that the underlying maps among kinds are not set-theoretic inclusions that are everywhere assumed in the literature. Such an inclusion assumes identity between, for exam¬ ple, a pup and the associated dog. Some underlying maps are not even injective. For example, an airline may count several passengers in association with a single person, it that person takes several trips with them.
Grammatical transformations and syllogisms
The nominal theory and its interpretation is used to decide the validity of syllogisms of the type discussed by Pelletier and Schubert [1989] and involving CNs MNs and predicables. To achieve this purpose, we need to build semantical counterparts to grammatical transformations of CNs into MNs, MNs into predicables and so on, extending our previous work La Palme Reyes et al [1994 b] . As an example, consider the syllogisms.
Claret is a wine, wine is a liquid, so claret is liquid. In the first premise, 'claret' is a NP (as in the first) and 'is liquid' is a VP. The NPs in this example are, however, like PNs (proper names) or descriptions. Cross linguistic evidence sug¬ gests that 'claret' is not a PN. In fact, in French, one uses the expression 'le bordeaux' and French does not allow the definite article in front of a PN. This suggests to categorize 'claret' as a descriptive noun phrase (DNP), i.e., as a noun phrase whose interpretation is a member of a kind. As in the paper cited above, we consider "is a wine' as a predicable derived from the term "wine', a CN as indicated by the occurrence of'a'. The second premise can be analyzed in a similar way. On the other hand, we will assume that 'is liquid' in the conclusion is a pre¬ dicable derived from the term 'liquid', an Mn as indicated by the absence of "a'.
At the level of interpretation, these grammatical transformations (or derivations) will take us into computations of colimits of interpretations in our categories to define notions of rela¬ tive entity, relative substance, etc.
5. Category theory versus set theory A final word about the use of category theory (rather than set theory) in our work. (For a more thorough discussion, see Magnan and Reyes [1994] A second observation concerns abstractness. Contrary to a widespread belief sel-theoretic semantics are more abstract than category-theoretic ones. This is easily understood when we compare usual set-theoretic semantics of CNs and MNs with our category-theoretic semantic. As we pointed out one of the main novelties of our approach is to take as the basic ingredients of our semantics the connection between dogs and animals, iron and metal, wines and wine, chicken and food, golden ring and gold, etc. These connections guided the choice of the cate¬ gories used to interpret CNs, MNs and QNs.
To give an example, any sup-lattice is also an inf-lattice and thus, from a set-theoretical point of view, it makes no difference whether to work with sup-lattices or inf-lattices. On the other hand, morphisms of sup-lattices are quite different from rnorphisms of inf-lattices and the following example shows that underlying relations do not preserve the intersection in gene¬ ral: take a person who has traveled twice, say, and consider the underlying map u at the level of sets of persons (which are sup-lattices as well as inf-lattices) which associates with a set of pas¬ sengers the underlying set of persons. Clearly u preserves arbitrary unions. On the other hand, u does not preserve binary intersection: letp, p' be the two passengers whose underlying person is John. Then if we take the intersection of the subset whose only element \sp (P) with the subset whose only elements is p ' (P'), we obtain the empty set and hence the image of this intersection by u is still the empty set. But if we intersect u (P) and u (P') we obtain the subset w hose only element is John. Other examples of this kind can be given to justify our choice of categories.
From this point of view, the trouble with set-theoretical semantics is simply this: they are too abstract, since they abstract away these fundamental relations, which are therefore not pro¬ perly represented (in these semantics). As a consequence, set-theoretical constructions are not contrained in a natural way: they are just too many and when a choice is required, extraneous principles, usually of a pragmatic nature, are brought in to decide the issue. On the other hand, categorical constructions are highly constrained through the use of universal properties: among all possible constructions one is distinguished as satisfying a universal property. Because of this feature, it has been argued that the theory of categories constitutes a theory of concrete univer¬ sals, set theory being rather a theory of abstract universals (see Ellerman [1988] 
